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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY 351
of contract between the parties.15 It has been generally held that
the implied warranty is in the nature of a contract of personal in-
demnity and does not "run with the goods". This theory of ex-
tent of liability is not universally approved, especially in the late
cases."" It is also intimated by some authorities that the seller's
liability should not rest so much upon privity of contract as upon
a violation of a duty voluntarily assumed, arising as an implication
of the common law.17  One very recent case holds that under the
sales act it was not the legislative intent that strict "privity of con-
tract" be essential to the bringing of an action by an ultimate con-
siner.18 It would seem safe to say that there is a definite trend,
at the present, toward an extension of the dealer's liability to in-
clude consumers other than the immediate purchaser. This would
seem desirable in view of the increased dependence of the public
on the dealer for food supply.
Note also, that the present case, by reference to prior decisions,
distinguishes the theory of liability of the packer or manufacturer
of articles intended for human consumption from that of the
dealer. The West Virginia court places the liability of the latter
on implied warranty, while liability of the former is definitely
based on negligence in the preparation of its product. 9 A separate
concurring opinion convincingly disapproves of this distinction as
an anomaly. In effect the dealer is an insurer while the packer's
responsibility is based on negligqnce. If a distinction is to be
made it would seem more justifiable under modern conditions to
place a higher duty on the manufacturer than on the dealer. It
is submitted that the same responsibility should be placed on both.
V. K. K.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE - RIGHT oF DEFENDANT TO SHOW
DUREsS WITHOUT OFFERING TO RESCIND ENTIRE CONTRACT. - A and
B conducted an automobile repair business at X city for a number
of years, first as a partnership and then as a corporation, of which
15 Redmond v. Borden's Farm Products Co., 245 N. Y. 512, 157 N. B. 838
(1927).
10 See Timmins v. F. N. Joslin Co., 22 N. E. (2d) 76, 123 A. L. R. 591
(Mass. 1939); Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 93 P. (2d) 799 (Cal. 1939),
superseding 86 P. (2d) 858 (Cal. 1939); Jensen v. Berris, 31 Cal. App. (2d)
537, 88 P. (2d) 220 (1939).
17 Flessher v. Carsten's Packing Co., 93 Wash. 48, 52, 160 Pac. 14 (1916).
is Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 93 P. (2d) 799 (Cal. 1939).
10 Webb v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 2 S. E. (2d) 898 (W. Va.
1939); Parr v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 3 S. E. (2d) 499 (W. Va. 1939);
Blevins v. Raleigh Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 3 S. E. (2d) 627 (W. Va. 1939);
Note (1939) 46 W. VA. L. Q. 82.
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they were the sole owners. A took a lease on the premises in which
the business was conducted in his own name to use as a "club"
over B so the latter would refrain from the excessive use of intoxi-
cating liquor. Sometime later a resolution dissolving the corpora-
tion was adopted and B sold all his interest in the corporate proper-
ty to A and covenanted not to engage in the same business for five
years within twenty-five miles of X city. B later breached the
covenant not to compete and A brought an action to compel specific
performance of the covenant. B resisted on the ground of duress
in the procurement of the contract. Held, that in an action for
specific performance an offer by the defendant to rescind the en-
tire contract is not a prerequisite to his showing that the contract
is tainted by duress. Hopkins v. Bryant.1
At first blush this case seems unsound because it would appear
that the defendant is being permitted to retain benefits under a
contract which he is trying to repudiate in part.2 However, a
closer examination of the case points to its soundness. The de-
fendant is not trying to rescind the contract but is simply resist-
ing plaintiff's attempt to get specific performance by showing un-
clean hands in the plaintiff.3 When the defendant sets up duress or
fraud as a defense to an action at law it is on the theory of rescission
and there must be a restoration to the plaintiff of all benefits re-
ceived under the contract.4 This puts the parties in the same
position they were in before the contract was made.5 In the princi-
pal case the defendant is setting up the duress not on the theory
of rescission but simply to show that the plaintiff's conduct has
barred his right to the extraordinary remedy of specific perform-
ance. There are few cases in which courts of equity insist on the
16 S. E. (2d) 246 (,W. Va. 1939).
2 The contract had been executed on both sides except as to the defendant's
covenant not to compete.
S It requires much less strength of case on the part of a defendant to resist
a bill to perform a contract, than it does on the part of the plaintiff to main-
tain a bill to enforce specific performance. Crotty v. Effler, 60 W. Va. 258, 265,
54 S. B. 345 (1906); Robenson v. Yann, 224 Ky. 56, 5 S. W. (2d) 271 (1928);
Morris v. Curtin, 321 Ill. 462, 152 N. B. 210 (1926).
4 Rescission is not allowable in an action at law unless the party seeking to
rescind can and does first restore or offer to restore any thing he has received
under the contract. Snow v. Alley, 144 Mass. 546, 11 N. E. 764 (1887); Los
Angeles Traction Co. v. Wilshire, 135 Cal. 654, 67 Pac. 1086 (1902); Roberts
v. James, 83 N. J. L. 492,-85 Atl. 244 (1912).
5 For latest West Virginia case dealing with the restoration requirements in
a suit for rescission see, National Life Ins. Co. v. Hanna, 7 S. E. (2d) 52 (W.
Va. 1940).
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maxim that he who seeks equity must do equity with more rigor
than in a suit for specific performance6
The Restatement of Contracts states the rule that a voidable
transaction cannot be avoided in part and affirmed in part when
the provisions are inseparable.7 This rule plainly has no appli-
cation to the principal case where the defendant is not attempting
to repudiate his obligation under the contract but rather to block
the plaintiff in his resort to the aid of a court of equity. A Florida
case8 clearly bears out this conclusion in holding that a defendant
could retain a $750,000 property received under a contract and yet
successfully defend, on the ground of unclean hands, a suit for
specific performance of a promise contained in that contracct to
mortgage the property. The court added that whether or not the
plaintiff had a remedy at law was no concern of the equity court.
This case and many others bear out the rule that the defendant
may always resist an action for specific performance by showing
unclean hands in the plaintiff even though the defendant has re-
ceived benefits under the contract.9 It is axiomatic that suits for
specific performance stand on a basis peculiar to themselves since
the remedy is an extraordinary one and is not a matter of right.10
Under the cases it is well settled that there is a middle ground
or zone in which certain cases fall where equity will recognize cer-
tain facts as a defense to specific performance of a contract and
yet will decline to order it cancelled, rescinded, or delivered up
upon those facts.'" The parties are left to their remedies at law.
The principal case falls within this category. In the absence of a
provision for liquidated damages for the breach of the covenant
not to compete the practical difficulty of proving the damages makes
it almost certain that the recovery would be small.
R. A. P.
6 Haggerty v. Elyton Land Co., 89 Ala. 428, 7 So. 651 (1890); Henley v.
Engler, 118 Ark. 283, 176 S. W. 330 (1915); Short v. Kieffer, 142 IM. 258, 31
N. E. 427 (1892).
7 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 487.
8 Dale v. Jennings, 90 Fla. 234, 107 So. 175 (1925).
' Carver v. Van Arsdale, 312 Ill. 220, 343 N. E. 579 (1924); Kleinberg v.
Ratett, 252 N. Y. 236, 169 N. E. 289 (1929); Haffner v. Dobrinski, 215 U. S.
446, 30 S. Ct. 172, 54 L. Ed. 277 (1910).
210 Rison v. Newberry, 90 Va. 513, 18 S. E. 916 (1894); Heflin v. Heflin, 63
W. Va. 29, 59 S. E. 745 (1907); Harrison v. Harrison, 36 W. Va. 556, 15 S. R.
87 (1892).
11 Humbard 's Heirs v. HumbardIs Heirs, 40 Tenn. 75 (1859); Stephens v.
Clark, 305 Il. 408, 137 N. E. 227 (1922); Leonard v. Crane, 147 I1. 52, 35
N. B. 474 (1893); 2 STORY, EQUITY (13th ed. 1886) § 693.
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